The Supreme Court rules out that a tenant can keep an old rental if he does not reside in the home even if his son occupies it

The Supreme Court rules out that a tenant can keep an old rental if he does not reside in the home even if his son occupies it

The Supreme Court has determined that the use by a child does not justify the forced extension of the old rental contract if economic dependence and a real need for housing is not demonstrated, clarifying that it is not a reason for continuity. Therefore, the owner could recover the home and end the contract since his tenant did not live in the home for more than six months during the year.

It all begins when the owner of the apartment, located in the center of Seville, filed a lawsuit against her tenant to have the indefinite lease contract that had been signed in 1982 declared terminated. This lawsuit was based on articles 62.3 and 114.11 of the Urban Leases Law (LAU) of 1964, which allow the forced extension of the rent to be denied when the home is not occupied for more than six months in the one year course.

The owner alleged that the tenant did not reside in Seville, but had his habitual, family, professional and business domicile in Antigua (Fuerteventura, Canary Islands). In addition, he reported that, after a period of vacancy, they had placed the name of the tenant’s daughter in the mailbox, who was living there for her studies. The tenant, for his part, denied ending the rental, arguing that his daughter had moved with him to Seville to study for a degree in computer engineering and that the home had been used continuously.

The path through the courts

At first, the Court of First Instance No. 1 of Seville ruled in favor of the owner. After the evidence presented by it (such as low electricity consumption or testimonies from neighbors and the property manager), it concluded that the tenant actually resided in Fuerteventura and that the house in Seville had been unoccupied for more than six months.

Furthermore, it determined that the use of the home as accommodation for the daughter’s university studies did not constitute the “tenant’s family home”, which was why it was excluded from the protection of the LAU of 1964. The tenant, not satisfied, appealed this ruling, and the Provincial Court of Seville ruled in his favor.

The Court considered that the apartment was being occupied in accordance with its purpose, since the “decided desire to use the apartment for his daughter” in response to the family interest was sufficient, despite the fact that the tenant did not live in the home permanently. At this point, the tenant did not give up and took the case to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court determines the termination of the rental contract

The owner, this time before the Supreme Court (STS 6069/2025), defended that the exceptional regime of forced extension is only justified to satisfy the tenant’s own habitual housing needs, not for the convenience of her student daughter. This agreed with him, confirming the termination of the lease contract.

The High Court indicated that the Provincial Court itself had not considered it proven that the tenant lived there, but rather assumed that the daughter occupied it due to her university studies. Regarding this, he clarified that a seasonal rental, such as that made for the purpose of studies for an academic year, is expressly excluded from the protection of the LAU of 1964 (art. 1.2).

According to the doctrine of the Supreme Court, if the tenant does not physically live in the property, it is he who has the burden of proving that the home meets the permanent housing need of a child and that, in addition, this child is financially dependent on him. Since, in this case, the tenant did not make any evidentiary effort to demonstrate this permanent need or the financial dependence of the student daughter, it could not be understood that he was complying with the requirement of keeping the home occupied for the purposes of maintaining the contract.

For this reason, the Supreme Court determined that the forced extension was not appropriate since the tenant’s vacancy without just cause had been proven, condemning him to vacate the home and place it at the disposal of the owner.