The public pension system is a system based on the contribution, that is, more quoted years greater will be the percentage of the regulatory base and therefore, greater retirement pension. Law 27/2011 sets that to charge 100% 36 years and six months of contribution are required in 2025, which will pass to 37 years in 2027. Above that threshold, who retires to the ordinary age does not increase the percentage, unless it takes retirement, in which case there are specific incentives. Even so, the relative profitability of the system does not grow indefinitely, as a Fedea analysis shows that places the point of higher performance around 36.5 years, from which the IRR begins to descend, according to an analysis of the laboratory of ideas that the internal rate of return (IRR) for different profiles and labor careers.
The main explanation lies in the Social Security architecture, since the complements to minimums and the complement by gender gap raise the benefits of those who reach retirement with lower contributory bases or more irregular careers.
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The study illustrates the phenomenon with a contrast. For example, a 25 -year -old worker would obtain, in terms of IRR, a yield close to 6%, approximately double that who exceeds 40 years of contributions. The paradox, Fedea clarifies, is only apparent, because the absolute amount of the pension of those who quote more years is usually superior, but the relative profitability of its contribution throughout working life is lower.
The key is how the system complexes operate. The Minimum accessories They guarantee a minimal pension to pensioners with benefits below certain thresholds and, therefore, proportionally raise short career pensions or modest wages. To this is added the gender gap complementwhich seeks to correct work trajectories with lower interruptions and quotes, more frequent among women. “If these backups are excluded, the differences soften, but the decreasing profile of profitability with many quoted years is maintained,” explains the report.
The employer is repeated, with nuances, in the special regime of autonomous workers. With accessories, the average tir of the self -employed is located slightly above that of the general regime. Without them, their profitability worsens in comparison, in part because they cannot fill the contribution gaps with the same generosity as employees. This restriction penalizes careers with periods without activity, relatively frequent among self -employed workers.
Moderate the revaluation of pensions or link retirement age to life expectancy
Given this diagnosis, Fedea proposes to reopen the reformist debate. Their recipes are to moderate the annual revaluation of pensions below the CPI (that is, that they continue to grow, but to a lesser extent), raise types of contribution to reinforce income, expand the computation period of the regulatory base to the entire working life and link the ordinary retirement age to life expectancy through automatic adjustments or periodic steps. In parallel, the entity warns of the growing weight of the State transfers to social security and asks to limit its use as a structural financing valve.
The proposals arrive after more than 10 years of changes. Law 27/2011 (that can be consulted in this boe) began the gradual increase of the legal age to retire and the calculation period; Subsequent reforms consolidated the indexation of pensions to the CPI and activated additional income mechanisms. Demographic aging, the mass incorporation of cohorts del ‘Baby Boom‘To retirement and the slowdown in the growth of the employed population once again tension the sustainability of the system and reopen the discussion about intergenerational equity and distribution of efforts between contributors and pensioners.
The potential impact of Fedea’s measures would not be homogeneous, since workers with short races and low bases would win, especially if the complements are maintained to minimal, while those with long running races and medium-high wages, which already register less relative profitability and would see their expectation of revaluation if it is decoupled from the IPC. The expansion of the period of calculation to a lifetime would favor short ascending trajectories and would harm lengths with high wages at the end of the race.